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INTRODUCTION 
The State has made two basic points in their brief. First, that the errors were 
harmless, or that absent the errors the "defendant would have enjoyed the 
likelihood of a more favorable trial outcome." (Appellee Br. at 6, see also pages 
3,10, and 16) Second, that the Defendant "opened the door to the subjects]" 
(Appellee Br. at. 9 and 14) The Defendant will address these issues in reverse 
order. 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT OPEN THE DOOR TO THE 
SUBJECTS OF THE THEFT OF THE MUSTANG AND THE 
FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT'S CHILDREN WERE IN THE 
CUSTODY OF DCFS. 
A. DCFS custody of the Defendant's children. 
The State has made the claim that the Defendant during trial opened the door 
to the questioning concerning the fact that the Defendant's children were in the 
custody of the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS). The State claims: 
"The matter at issue here came up not during the State's case, but during 
defendant's case, while defense counsel was questioning his only witness, 
defendant's wife." (Appellee Br. at 8) Although the only time the defense counsel 
objected to this area of evidence occurred during the cross-examination of the 
defendant's wife, the issue had long before been repeatedly referred to by the State. 
Not two pages into the prosecutions opening statement the prosecutor stated: "So 
900 Century Drive is in the area of the Offices of Division of Child Welfare, 
Family Services..." (R. 074/ pg 7) Both of the officers, who were the only real fact 
witnesses in the State's case1, testified that the Defendant was arrested in the area 
ofDCFS. 
The questioning of defense counsel which supposedly "opened the door" to 
the inquiry by the State "Why was the reason [sic] for the trip to DCFS" and 
"Where were [the children]" (R. 074/ 69) were some non-responsive answers to 
defense counsel questions that merely reaffirmed the fact that the area of arrest was 
the DCFS facility, a fact already referred to on numerous occasions during State's 
case in chief. Furthermore, the only possible motive of the State's inquiry in to the 
reason for the trip to DCFS and the question eliciting the response that the children 
were in "State's custody" was to prejudice the jury against the Defendant in a 
questionable case. 
B. Theft of Mustang vehicle 
The State has made the claim that the issue of the Defendant being a suspect 
in the theft of the Mustang vehicle was also as a result of the Defendant opening 
1
 The other two State witnesses Dave Stanger and Julianna Taylor were the 
evidence custodian and the criminalist who analyzed the residue. 
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the door. (Appellee Br. at 13) While the State acknowledges that the prosecutor 
made reference to the auto theft in his opening statement, and repeatedly during the 
testimony of both main fact witnesses, they thereafter claim that the question "In 
fact the vehicle was registered to someone else" was permissible since the defense 
witness opened the door. 
Next, the State takes the position that since defense counsel spends two 
paragraphs in closing argument explaining the Mustang, he has invited the error 
through trial strategy . Even a cursory reading of those two paragraphs (which is 
approximately lA of defense counsel's entire closing argument) reveals that the 
purpose of this explanation is to attempt to rectify the misconception that the 
Defendant was a car thief. 
The reality of the situation is that by the time the prosecutor's line of 
questioning to the Defendant's wife arrived, the prosecutor had referenced the theft 
of the Mustang no fewer than 11 times. And by the time the defense tries to explain 
away the Mustang issue in closing argument it had been referred to by the 
0 
The State claims: "Here, any improper questioning by the State was more than 
overshadowed by defense counsel's own remarks during his closing statement. 
Apparently choosing as a matter of trial strategy to defuse defendant's wife's 
testimony by explaining it further, defense counsel's closing argument so 
overemphasized defendant's involvement in the unrelated car theft case that any 
previous mention of it by the State was rendered de mininis by comparison" 
(Appellee Br. at 14) 
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prosecutor no fewer than 5 additional times, including twice in closing. To 
maintain that the defendant somehow opened this Pandora's box is to defy reality. 
POINT II 
THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE 
MUSTANG VEHICLE, DCFS AND THE DEFENDANT'S 
HOMELESS STATUS DID PREJUDICE THE OUTCOME OF 
THE TRIAL. 
The State makes the claim that even if the trial court committed error and 
plain error in allowing evidence of the Defendant's homelessness status, the 
Mustang vehicle, and repeated references to DCFS, the errors were harmless, since 
the proof of guilt was sufficiently strong to warrant a conviction without these 
references. Logic tells us otherwise. 
A careful reading of the trial transcript reveals that either the trial prosecutor 
was unbelievably bumbling and totally detached from reality, or he recognized the 
weakness of his case and attempted to bolster that weakness by painting a picture 
of a car stealing, child abusing, homeless good for nothing defendant, who among 
other numerous failings, possessed methamphetamine. There simply is no plausible 
reason to ask questions of the Defendant's homeless status. The State so much as 
acknowledges this fact by its failure to propound any legitimate reason in its brief. 
Likewise, there is no reason to refer to the alleged stolen Mustang repeatedly 
throughout the trial. The lone reason put forth by the State for this evidence is 
foundation. The flaw in this logic is that this type of foundational evidence is 
4 
completely unnecessary, and the danger of unfair prejudice to the Defendant is 
enormous. If the trial prosecutor truly used this evidence solely for foundation, 
then he laid and re-laid his foundation more often than Appellant's counsel has 
ever seen in 18 years of extensive trial practice. Logic and reason guide us to the 
only conclusion that the prosecutor repeatedly used the "stolen" Mustang evidence 
to prejudice the jury against the Defendant due to his realization of a weak case. 
How else can one explain the prosecutor's request to the jury in closing: "And let's 
see what we can infer about her testimony there. They don't park at the DCFS 
building; they park a block and a half, two blocks away at least."(R. 074/ at 91) 
. The repeated references to DCFS throughout trial were a similar attempt to 
prejudice the jury against the defendant. Again, no reason is suggested by the State 
as to the necessity that this information be presented to the jury. The danger of 
unfair prejudice is real, and the prosecution's calculated effect of this evidence is 
established by the result. 
If there were one or two isolated incidents of this type of evidence during a 
lengthy trial, it could be overlooked. But where the bulk of the prosecution's case 
rested on these improper inferences rather than on evidence of intent or knowledge 
of the possession by the Defendant, justice requires reversal and a new trial. For 
the prosecutor to spend 32% of his trial time on this prejudicial evidence is wrong. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests that this court 
reverse his conviction and remand the case for a nevy trial 
DATED this ^ d a y of January, 2003. / ., . 
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